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Abstract
Background and Objective
Counterfactual thinking (CFT) refers to the generation of mental simulations of alternatives
to past events, actions and outcomes. CFT is a pervasive cognitive feature in every-day life
and is closely related to decision-making, planning and problem-solving – all of which are
cognitive processes linked to unimpaired frontal lobe functioning. Huntington’s Disease
(HD) is a neurodegenerative disorder characterised by motor, behavioral and cognitive dys-
functions. Because an impairment in frontal and executive functions has been described in
HD, we hypothesised that HD patients may have a CFT impairment.
Methods
Tests of spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and counterfactual-derived inferences were
administered to 24 symptomatic HD patients and 24 age- and sex-matched healthy
subjects.
Results
Our results show a significant impairment in the spontaneous generation of CFT and low
performance on the Counterfactual Inference Test (CIT) in HD patients. Low performance
on the spontaneous CFT test significantly correlates with impaired attention abilities, verbal
fluency and frontal lobe efficiency, as measured by Trail Making Test – Part A, Phonemic
Verbal Fluency Test and FAB.
Conclusions
Spontaneous CFT and the use of this type of reasoning are impaired in HD patients. This
deficit may be related to frontal lobe dysfunction, which is a hallmark of HD. Because CFT
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has a pervasive role in patients’ daily lives regarding their planning, decision making and
problem solving skills, cognitive rehabilitation may improve HD patients’ ability to analyse
current behaviors and future actions.
Introduction
The ability of learning from past experience and predicting future events are cognitive skills
needful for social interaction that depend on a specific type of reasoning called counterfactual
thinking (CFT). CFT is defined as the mental simulation of alternatives to past factual events
[1]; it is a pervasive feature of everyday life that has a central role in evaluating actual events
and helps people in regulating their future behaviors. The control and regulation of behavioral
output depends on many different processes, such as representation of desired goals, response
selection and execution, monitoring and comparing the actual performance with any specific
aim and adjusting behavior in order to achieve the outcome. All of the above mentioned pro-
cesses of behavioral executive control are traditionally linked to prefrontal cortex (PFC) func-
tioning. Several studies have demonstrated that patients with PFC lesions show an impairment
in cognitive reasoning and insight [2], perseveration [3], social dysfunction [4] and exhibit in-
sensitivity to the long-term consequences of current decisions and decision-making [5]. Social
dysfunction and decision-making impairments in these patients have been associated with def-
icits in CFT generation [6]. In particular, CFT was found to be impaired in clinical population
suffering from frontal involvement, including patients with dorsolateral PFC damage [6],
strictly prefrontal cortex lesions [7] and schizophrenia [8], with the exception of Tourette’s
syndrome patients [9]. In particular, Hooker et al [8] reported a specific impairment in schizo-
phrenic patients regarding counterfactual-derived inferences, as assessed by the Counterfactual
Inference Test (CIT). Counterfactual deficits have also been reported in Parkinson’s disease
(PD), a neurodegenerative disorder that causes atrophy of the fronto-striatal regions. McNa-
mara et al [10] showed impaired spontaneous CFT generation and CFT use in PD patients;
they showed a progressive dysexecutive syndrome, resulting in a deficit in planning, strategy
evaluation and behavioral regulation, which is partly reflected in the impaired spontaneous
CFT generation. These neuropsychological data are strengthened by neuroimaging evidence,
which suggests that CFT is supported by the medial prefrontal cortex [11] and, more specifical-
ly, by a brain network involving the medial prefrontal cortex, right prefrontal cortex, posterior
medial frontal cortex, areas related to memory (hippocampal area, temporal lobes, midline and
lateral parietal lobes) and the inferior parietal lobe bilaterally [12].
Therefore, converging clinical and neuroradiological evidence demonstrates that the ability
to generate counterfactual alternatives of reality relies on the PFC integrity.
Huntington’s disease (HD) is an autosomal dominant inherited neurodegenerative disorder,
characterised by motor dysfunctions, behavioral and psychiatric disturbances and cognitive
impairment [13]. Neuroimaging studies of HD patients showed wide atrophy of the striatum
[14,15], frontal [16], temporal [17] and parietal cortices [18]. Because of the early atrophy of
the caudate and its connections with the prefrontal and frontal cortex, executive functions are
particularly impaired in HD. As the disease evolves, dysfunctions in divided attention, plan-
ning, problem solving and cognitive flexibility become more evident and tend to deteriorate
rather quickly [19]. Finally, cognitive impairment gradually worsens to a pattern of subcortical
dementia, suggesting a severe damage of frontal lobe functioning [7]. Notwithstanding the
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growing evidence for executive dysfunctions in HD, no study has focused on CFT in
these patients.
As previously demonstrated, CFT abilities are strictly related to frontal-executive and plan-
ning skills integrity. Therefore, our study aims at determining whether HD patients show diffi-
culties in CFT and whether CFT correlates with frontal executive functions or psychological
symptoms. As CFT abilities play a pivotal role in the control of behavioural outputs, our study
will provide relevant information for the management of HD patients’ and caregivers’ daily life
and for the improvement of the effectiveness of cognitive rehabilitation programs.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-four symptomatic patients (12 males and 12 females) with genetically confirmed HD
were recruited from the outpatient Movement Disorders Center of Istituto Auxologico Italiano,
IRCCS, San Luca Hospital, in Milan. All the HD patients had had DNA analysis demonstrating
more than 39 CAG repeats. Patients were evaluated by a neurologist with expertise in HD (A.
C.). Exclusion criteria were: history of substance abuse and concurrent other neurological or
psychiatric diseases. Genetic and clinical data of patients are reported in Table 1. Twenty-four
control subjects (12 males and 12 females) were recruited from the Milan area community. Ex-
clusion criteria were: history of substance abuse and the presence of neurological or psychiatric
diseases. HD patients and controls were matched for age (mean ± SD: HD = 52.33 ± 13.82
years; controls = 52.46 ± 14.02 years; unpaired t-test p = 0.975), and education (mean ±SD:
HD = 11.38 ± 3.19 years; controls = 11.17 ± 2.87 years; unpaired t-test p = 0.812).
All eligible participants received verbal and written information about the study and provid-
ed signed, informed consent, according to the Declaration of Helsinki. The study protocol was
approved by the Ethics Committee of Istituto Auxologico Italiano.
Measures and procedure
Age at onset (AO) was defined as the time when motor clinical manifestations alone first be-
came noticeable. The patients Total Motor Score (TMS) and the Maximal Chorea subscore
were assessed using the Unified Huntington Disease Rating Scale—Part I (UHDRS-I) [20]
(Table 1). Higher scores indicate a more severe motor impairment. All participants underwent
an extensive neuropsychological and psychological assessment; the testing battery included
counterfactual measures, cognitive tests—particularly investigating frontal functioning—and
psychological questionnaires.
Table 1. Demographic, clinical and genetic data of HD patients and control subjects.
Symptomatic HD patients (N = 24) Control subjects (N = 24)
Age (years) 52.33 ± 13.82 (27–78) 52.46 ± 14.02 (28–76)
Education (years) 11.38 ± 3.19 (7–17) 11.17 ± 2.87 (8–17)
CAG repeats number 45.04 ± 5.23 (39–64) —
Age at onset (years) 47.09 ± 14.49 (23–76) —
Duration of illness (years) 5.4 ± 3.6 (1–15) —
Total Motor Score—UHDRS Part I 40.37±18.79 (15–76) —
Maximal Chorea—UHDRS Part I 10.04±5.09 (0–18) —
Data are expressed as mean±SD (range). UHDRS Part I: Uniﬁed Huntington Disease Rating Scale Part I
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126773.t001
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Counterfactual measures. Similar to the studies of Hooker et al [8], Zago et al [9] and
Hetts et al [21], participants underwent an ad hoc battery of three CFT tests:
• Spontaneous Counterfactual Generation Test, which focuses on frequency of CFT in response
to a personal, real-life event. Participants were first asked to recall a negative personal event;
they were given three minutes to analyse this event in detail. Negative rather than positive
events were used because spontaneous CFT has been found to be enhanced by negative
events [22], rather than by positive ones. Participants were then asked if, when recalling their
personal life events, they had any thoughts of how things might have gone differently, ie,
thoughts of “if only” or “what if”. Responses were recorded and the number of counterfactual
thoughts was tabulated. Counterfactual thoughts were defined as any thoughts that offered a
different alternative action that might have been taken [8].
• Counterfactual Inference Test (CIT), designed by Hooker and colleagues [8]. The CIT analy-
ses the ability to use CFT in order to make inferences. It is based on past research regarding
those factors that have been shown to heighten CFT. Kahneman and Tversky [23], for exam-
ple, found that outcomes preceded by unusual rather than typical actions enhance CFT;
moreover, events that seem spatially or temporally to “almost” have occurred also increase
CFT [1]. Thus, CIT is a four question forced choice test; for each question, events experi-
enced by two individuals are presented and three response options are given. The two sub-
jects experience similar outcomes, but the circumstances between them differ such that one
should think “if only” to a greater extent than the other (S1 Table).
• The third CFT test focuses on the influence of anticipated counterfactual regret on behavior,
testing the hypothesis that the anticipation of regret influences decision making. Participants
randomly received one of three versions (A, B, C) of a scenario, which were designed by
Hetts and colleagues [21]; they were then asked to read the scenario carefully and to imagine
that the scenario was happening to them. In all versions, participants were asked to imagine
that they had just arrived at the office the morning of an important job interview:
• Imagine that you are driving to the office where you have an important job interview, for which
you have waited a long time. Further, imagine that, after parking the car, you are walking to the
office in a bit of a rush because you do not want to be late for the interview. On the way to office,
however, you get a strange feeling that you may have left your car door unlocked. Try as you
might, you cannot be absolutely certain whether or not you locked the door.
One-third of participants received the scenario exactly as described above (version C), that
is the neutral scenario, which does not evoke any feeling of regret.
In contrast, different endings in versions A and B (S2 Table) were administered in order to
induce a specific counterfactual thought, which evokes a feeling of regret, thus influencing par-
ticipants’ decision making. In fact, the anticipation of counterfactual regret is assumed to influ-
ence later behavioral intentions. Prior to a decision, participants induced to consider a
potential regret (version A and B) will be more inclined to choose behaviors that minimise the
chances of experiencing that negative regret.
After imaging themselves in the respective situations, participants were asked to decide
whether they would go back to check their car or go straight to the office for the job interview.
Finally, we assessed the participants’ level of confidence, asking them to state the accuracy of
their choices on a Likert scale from 0 (totally incorrect) to 5 (totally correct).
Cognitive tests. TheMini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) [24], which assesses the
global cognitive status, was administered to investigate if dysfunctions in counterfactual think-
ing were not simply reducible to global deficits in cognition. We also evaluated logical-abstract
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reasoning (Raven Progressive Matrices Test) [25], short- and long-term verbal memory (Rey’s
15 Words Test) [26], verbal comprehension (Token Test) [27], frontal, attentive and executive
functioning (Frontal Assessment Battery-FAB; Trail Making Test-TMT) [28,29]. Moreover,
participants underwent the cognitive tasks included in the UHDRS Part II [20]: Stroop Interfer-
ence Test [30], Verbal Phonemic Fluency Test [31] and Symbol Digit Modalities Test [32].
Psychological questionnaires. Because psychiatric symptoms are one hallmark of HD, we
evaluated the presence of depression (Beck Depression Inventory—BDI) [33], anxiety (State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory—STAI Y1/Y2) [34] and other psychopathological symptoms (Symptoms
Check List—SCL-90) [35]. We also assessed functional health and well-being (Short Form-36
Health Survey—SF-36) [36], social competence in ecological settings (Dysexecutive Question-
naire_Subject Form—DEX-S) [37], self-esteem (Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale—SES) [38], locus-
of-control (Rotter I-E Scale) [39] and personality (Big-Five Questionnaire—BFQ) [40].
Statistical analysis
Statistical analyses were performed with Sigmastat 3.5. Data are presented as the mean ± SD.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to test data for normality; the Levene’s test was used
to verify the assumption of homogeneity of group variances.
Data drawn from normally distributed populations with equal variance were compared
with the analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure, followed by the Tukey test. Samples drawn
from non-normal populations or those showing non-equal variances were compared with
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA, followed by Dunn’s test. Pearson or Spearman correlation coeffi-
cients were used to test data for potential correlations.
Results
Frontal dysexecutive dysfunctions in HD patients
As reported in Table 2, HD patients showed the typical features of frontal dysexecutive dys-
function, ie, deficits in attention (Trail Making Test-Part A, B and B-A), frontal efficiency
(Frontal Assessment Battery), and logical-deductive reasoning (Raven Progressive Matrices
Test). Moreover, HD patients performed significantly worse than control subjects on measures
of global cognitive functioning (MMSE), short- and long-term verbal memory (Rey’s 15 Words
Test—Immediate and Delayed) and verbal comprehension (Token Test). As expected, HD pa-
tients’ performance on UHDRS Part II cognitive tasks (Stroop Interference Test, Verbal Phone-
mic Fluency Test, Symbol Digit Modalities Test) were significantly lower than control subjects.
Lack of awareness on cognitive, behavioral and psychological
symptoms in HD patients
In order to obtain data about ecological and social functioning, as well as relevant information
about patients’ psychopathological symptoms, personality, social competence in daily-life set-
tings, quality of life, self-esteem and locus of control, HD patients were assessed with a wide
battery of psychological questionnaire including Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI Y1/Y2), Symptoms Check List (SCL-90), Big-Five Questionnaire
(BFQ), Dysexecutive Questionnaire Subject Form (DEX-S), Short Form-36 Health Survey (SF-
36), Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (SES) and Rotter I-E Scale. As shown in Table 3, HD patients
showed significantly higher scores on the assessment of state anxiety (STAI-Y1) when com-
pared to control subjects; in contrast, no differences were noted between HD and control sub-
jects on trait anxiety evaluation (STAI-Y2). HD patients had lower scores than control subjects
on the Rosenberg SES, demonstrating a lower level of perceived self-esteem. Moreover, they
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showed lower scores than controls on the survey on health status (SF-36) in the domains of
physical functioning, role limitations due to physical health, general health and social function-
ing. Regarding the personality dimensions (measured by BFQ) HD patients were found to be
more friendly and welcoming, more able to control their impulsiveness, and altogether more
calm and balanced than control subjects. Unexpectedly, HD patients received lower scores on
Table 2. Cognitive measures in HD patients and control subjects.
HD patients Control subjects ρ value
TMT—Part A 81.87±55.20 31.54±27.22 0.000002 (Kruskal-Wallis)
TMT—Part B 226±116.63 80.12±51.74 0.000003 (Kruskal-Wallis)
TMT—Part B-A 154.54±83.57 49.58±29.98 0.000003 (Kruskal-Wallis)
FAB 13.60±3.21 16.53±1.40 0.000068 (Kruskal-Wallis)
RCPM 24.07±5.36 30.49±2.66 0.000011 (Kruskal-Wallis)
MMSE 25.54±2.83 28.00±1.41 0.000332 (Kruskal-Wallis)
Rey’s Imm 29.92±11.00 43.00±7.86 0.000021 (ANOVA)
Rey’s Del 5.76±2.85 8.37±2.26 0.000998 (ANOVA)
Token Test 29.88±3.18 33.29±1.08 0.000019 (Kruskal-Wallis)
Stroop Interf Test (rs) 13.96±9.16 22.92±7.37 0.000519 (ANOVA)
Verbal Phon Flu Test 18.33±10.13 43.79±9.99 0.000001 (ANOVA)
Symbol Digit 22.96±11.06 49.46±13.00 0.000001 (ANOVA)
Data are expressed as mean±SD. TMT: Trail Making Test; FAB: Frontal Assessment Battery; RCPM:
Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices; MMSE: Mini-Mental State Examination; Rey’s Imm: Rey's 15 Words
Test Immediate Recall; Rey's Del: Rey's 15 Words Test Delayed Recall; Token Test: Token Test; Stroop
Int Test (rs): Stroop Colour-Word Interference Test (raw score); Verbal Phon Flu Test: Verbal Phonemic
Fluency Test; Symbol Digit: Symbol Digit Modalities Test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126773.t002
Table 3. Psychological measures in HD patients and control subjects.
HD patients Control subjects P value
STAI-Y1 49.58±10.23 42.38±8.50 0.009 (Kruskal-Wallis)
STAI-Y2 47.92±12.15 43.92±9.01 0.202 (ANOVA)
Rosenberg SES 21.08±6.47 25.21±3.61 0.009 (ANOVA)
SF-36 PF 79.37±19.30 93.54±9.94 0.002 (Kruskal-Wallis)
SF-36 RP 68.42±31.90 89.67±13.61 0.023 (Kruskal-Wallis)
SF-36 GH 59.21±23.50 76.21±18.40 0.008 (Kruskal-Wallis)
SF-36 SF 57.29±46.32 86.46±23.29 0.010 (Kruskal-Wallis)
BFQ Friend Tot (rs) 87.92±7.04 83.13±9.06 0.047 (ANOVA)
BFQ Emotional Stab IC (T) 59.63±7.72 52.58±7.91 0.003 (ANOVA)
BFQ Lie (T) 60.17±9.13 51.33±7.23 0.0005 (ANOVA)
Rotter I-E Scale (T) 54.17±7.65 60.25±11.75 0.028 (Kruskal-Wallis)
BDI Tot. 10.08±11.30 5.79±6.19 0.456 (Kruskal-Wallis)
DEX 14.29±12.17 11.13±6.71 0.749 (Kruskal-Wallis)
Data are expressed as mean±SD. STAI-Y1/Y2: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; Rosenberg SES: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; SF-36 PF: physical
functioning; SF-36 RP: role limitations due to physical health; SF-36 GH: general health; SF-36 SF: social functioning; BFQ Friend Tot (rs): Big Five
Questionnaire Friendliness Total raw score; BFQ Emotional Stab IC: Big Five Questionnaire Emotional Stability-Impulse Control (T Score); BFQ Lie (T):
Big Five Questionnaire Lie (T Score); Rotter I-E Scale (T): Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (T score); BDI Tot: Beck Depression Inventory
Total Score; DEX: Dysexecutive Questionnaire.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126773.t003
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the Rotter I-E Scale, which demonstrated an internal locus of control, ie they feel personally re-
sponsible for things happening to them and they do not think that their outcomes depend on
forces beyond their control.
No significant differences were found between HD patients and control subjects on the
questionnaires assessing the presence of depression (BDI), frontal-executive functions in daily
life (DEX-S) (Table 3) and other psychopathological symptoms (SCL-90) (SCL-90 SOM—Me-
dian: HD = 2.5, Controls = 4 p = 0.054; SCL-90 OC—Median: HD = 4.5, Controls = 2.5,
p = 0.187; SCL-90 IS—Median: HD = 1, Controls = 1, p = 0.590; SCL-90 DEP—Median:
HD = 4, Controls = 3, p = 0.779; SCL-90 ANX—Median: HD = 2, Controls = 2, p = 0.754; SCL-
90 HOS—Median: HD = 1, Controls = 1, p = 0.505; SCL-90 PHOB—Median: HD = 0, Con-
trols = 1, p = 0.136; SCL-90 PAR—Median: HD = 1, Controls = 2, p = 0.263; SCL-90 PSY—Me-
dian: HD = 1.5; Controls = 0; p = 0.058); these results were in spite of the presence of
behavioral disorders and impaired executive abilities recorded on the cognitive tests.
Counterfactual thinking is impaired in HD patients.
When compared to control subjects, HD patients generated significantly fewer spontaneous
CFT after recalling a negative life event (Median: HD = 1.5; Controls = 3; Kruskal-Wallis
p<0.000001). In particular, as shown in Table 4 and Fig 1, 21% of patients were not able to
generate any spontaneous counterfactual thoughts; moreover, the number of counterfactual
thoughts generated by patients ranged from zero to three, while control subjects generated
from two to seven counterfactual thoughts. HD patients also obtained significantly lower scores
on CIT (Median: HD = 1; Controls = 3; Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.000013). Table 5 and Fig 2 show
that the majority of patients achieved a score of 0 at the CIT, while the majority of control sub-
jects scored 4 at the same test.
Conversely, HD and control subjects did not differ either on the test focused on the influ-
ence of anticipated counterfactual regret on behavior (p = 0.685), or in the level of confidence
shown (Median: HD = 4; Controls = 4; Kruskal-Wallis p = 0.826).
As expected, in the HD group, the Spontaneous Counterfactual Generation Test significantly
correlated with measures of verbal fluency on the Phonemic Verbal Fluency Test (r = 0.540,
p = 0.007); attention ability on the Trail Making Test—Part A (r = -0.456, p = 0.025); frontal lobe
efficiency on FAB (r = 0.430, p = 0.036) and words reading on the Stroop Interference Test—
Words Reading subscore (r = 0.578, p = 0.003). Moreover, the Spontaneous Counterfactual Gen-
eration Test correlated with measures of short- and long-termmemory, as assessed by the Rey’s
15Words Test (immediate recall: r = 0.548, p = 0.006; delayed recall: r = 0.411, p = 0.045)
(Table 6).
Table 4. Numbers of spontaneous CFT generated by HD patients and control subjects.
No of spontaneous CFT HD patients Control subjects
0 5 (21%) 0
1 7 (29%) 0
2 11 (46%) 2 (8%)
3 1 (4%) 20 (84%)
4 0 1 (4%)
5 0 0
6 0 0
7 0 1 (4%)
Median of Spontaneous Counterfactual Generation Test 1.5 3
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126773.t004
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On the contrary, the scores recorded on CIT and the level of confidence on the test of the in-
fluence of anticipated regret did not correlate with any cognitive measures (S3 Table).
As shown in S4 Table, no significant correlations were found between the performance at
CFT tests and CAG repeat length, AO, duration of illness and motor impairment scores (TMS-
and Maximal Chorea-UHDRS Part I).
To test the hypothesis that some patients’ psychological features could play a role in the
causal attribution process implicated in the generation of counterfactual alternatives to real
events, we analyzed the relationship between such psychological features and performance at
CFT tests. No significant correlations were found between the CFT tests and the psychological
measures assessing self-esteem, locus-of-control, personality, the presence of depression, anxi-
ety or other psychopathological symptoms, functional health and well-being and social compe-
tence in ecological settings (S5 Table).
Discussion
Our results show an impaired ability to spontaneously generate counterfactual thoughts in HD
patients. Indeed, HD patients reported fewer mental alternatives in response to recall of a nega-
tive personal event when compared to control subjects. Moreover, HD patients were not as
skilled as control subjects in using CFT for deriving inferences regarding hypothetical social
events, as demonstrated at the CIT. CFT spontaneous generation significantly correlated with
Table 5. Scores obtained atCIT by HD patients and control subjects.
CIT Score HD patients Control subjects
0 11 (46%) 0
1 6 (25%) 7 (29%)
2 5 (21%) 1 (4%)
3 2 (8%) 7 (29%)
4 0 9 (38%)
Median CIT score 1 3
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126773.t005
Fig 1. HD patients’ and control subjects’ performance on Spontaneous Counterfactual Generation Test. The graph shows the percentage of subjects
who generated a specific number of spontaneous counterfactual thoughts.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126773.g001
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frontal efficiency scores, such as Phonemic Verbal Fluency and FAB, thus confirming the cru-
cial role of frontal areas in CFT generation abilities. Moreover, results obtained from HD pa-
tients in each cognitive test showed the presence of a frontal-subcortical impairment, which
could be responsible for the poor performance on both counterfactual generation task and CIT.
Even if HD patients differed from controls regarding both Spontaneous Counterfactual Genera-
tion Test and CIT, only the former correlated with cognitive measures. The absence of signifi-
cant correlation between CIT and cognitive measures may be probably attributed to a specific
frontal involvement of the CIT, which could be related to more complex abstraction, social cog-
nition and Theory of Mind based abilities, only partially assessed in our extensive battery.
Overall, our findings confirm that frontal dysfunction plays a relevant role in CFT impairment
in HD, as demonstrated by correlation between counterfactual performance and measures of
frontal efficiency. As previously highlighted [9], one possible reason of impaired CFT may be
attributed to the role played by the frontal lobe in determining the working memory load; to
evoke a counterfactual thought, it is necessary to hold the memory of a past unpleasant event
in the working memory stores sufficiently to compare what actually happens with the counter-
factually derived alternatives. Holding such complex information in working memory stores
requires one to withstand possible interferences; this process is known to be mediated by the
frontal lobes. In order to verify such hypothesis, specific measures of working memory should
be included in future studies when assessing CFT abilities. The interference effect may be a pos-
sible alternative explanation for the inability of HD patients to efficiently generate counterfac-
tual models. However, we did not find any correlations between the Stroop Interference Test—
Fig 2. HD patients’ and control subjects’ performance onCounterfactual Inference Test (CIT). The graph shows the different percentage distribution of
the CIT scores among HD patients and control subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126773.g002
Table 6. Correlations between Spontaneous Counterfactual Generation Test and cognitive tests in
HD patients.
Correlation Coefﬁcient r ρ value
Verbal Phonemic Fluency Test .540 0.007
Trail Making Test—Part A -.456 0.025
Frontal Assessment Battery .430 0.036
Stroop Interference Test—Words Reading .578 0.003
Rey’s 15 Words Immediate Recall .548 0.006
Rey’s 15 Words Delayed Recall .411 0.045
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126773.t006
CFT in Huntington's Disease
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Interference subscore and performance on CFT tests. This unexpected result could be partly ex-
plained by different neural anatomical substrates involved in these two frontal cognitive mea-
sures [41,42]; future functional neuroimaging studies may provide new insight in support of
these findings. The difficulty in generating alternative scenarios to adverse personal experi-
ences may depend also on poor memory efficiency in retrieving or generating detailed reports
of a negative life event when compared to controls. As such, the specificity of frontal im-
pairment in defining CFT deficits in HD patients remains unsolved.
However, our data demonstrate a clear counterfactual thinking impairment in HD patients,
which may reasonably account for some ecological cognitive and behavioral changes associated
with the disease. In fact, as the disease develops, HD patients show a reduced mental flexibility:
they become more rigid, unbending and perseverative, especially in daily life activities, as de-
tected by tests of executive functioning. In addition, the ability to cope with the typical motor
and cognitive difficulties of the disease may be influenced by the impairment of CFT genera-
tion; this may partly account for the difficulty of these patients to learn from their past experi-
ences and to avoid maladaptive behaviors.
In contrast to Gomez Beldarrain and colleagues [7], we did not find any significant correla-
tion between patients’ CFT performance and other emotional and personality traits, such as
self-esteem, locus-of-control, depression or anxiety. This difference may be explained by the
different consequences of a strictly focal frontal lesion, mainly unilateral, as described by
Gomez Beldarrain et al, compared to a more widespread neurodegenerative disease, such as
HD, which shows a broader frontal involvement and a wide atrophy of other brain regions.
Furthermore, our HD patients subjectively reported to be less depressed and to have an higher
self-esteem. Such evidence could have led to an absence of significant correlations between
such measures and CFT tests in our sample, contrary to Gomez Beldarrain et al’s patients, who
were more depressed and showed a lower self-esteem. We could hypothesise that such differ-
ences between the two frontal populations could be due to the possible presence of an unaware-
ness condition (or anosodiaphoria) in our HD patients sample, as previously reported in
literature [43]. Also the fact that our HD patients were more friendly and welcoming, more
calm and balanced than control subjects could be attributed and explained by an enhanced
self-centered dimension, combined with the lack of consciousness and awareness, ie, anosog-
nosia and anosodiaphoria, which often characterize HD patients. Furthermore, HD patients
obtained higher values at the BFQ-Lie scale, which demonstrated that they had a higher num-
ber of positively distorted self-impression responses, maybe due to the above described aware-
ness deficit. Hence, unawareness represents an important feature to be carefully examined and
screened in HD patients, especially when administering them with subjective self-reports.
Our results are relevant for the understanding of HD patients’ difficulty in managing inter-
personal relationships and social situations. The inability to generate mental simulations of al-
ternatives of current and past actions and events may cause difficulties in properly handling
social interactions and in planning future actions with others.
Conclusions
Counterfactual thinking is crucial to self-reflective thought and is strongly mediated by the effi-
ciency of the frontal lobe. Moreover, it seems to be a pervasive aspect of daily life because it has
a central role in planning, decision-making and problem-solving. In order to draw inferences
regarding possible social scenarios, HD patients’ impairment in generating and using CFT may
be considered a typical feature of the dysexecutive syndrome, which characterises these pa-
tients. The ecological impact of this impairment is not yet completely understood; evidence
suggests a relevant role of such cognitive function in patients’ social behaviour [8,10,44]. In
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summary, CFT may be reliably used to evaluate social and working abilities in patients affected
by HD; it should also be targeted in cognitive rehabilitation programs. Even if other neurologi-
cal and psychiatric populations have been found to have an impaired ability to generate coun-
terfactual thoughts, further studies are needed in order to define the specificity of CFT deficits
in HD patients. Thus, future research should explore counterfactual interactions, not only with
purely cognitive abilities but also with social cognition skills, considering unawareness as an
important feature when administering subjective reports and measures to such
clinical population.
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